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Critical Challenges: A Conversation on  
Complicity and Civility in Legal Academia 
Penelope E. Andrews1 
Sharon K. Hom2 
Ruthann Robson3 
INTRODUCTION 
Perhaps no dispute within the academy is more divisive than one 
accompanying the denial of tenure to a colleague.  Such controversies call 
into question the nature of professional competence and judgment, of our 
roles as scholars, teachers, and colleagues, and of the future of the 
institution.  Moreover, like other events in the academy, such disagreements 
occur in a field populated by racial, gender, sexual, class, and other 
identities.4  Academic freedom and freedom of speech are often implicated 5 
and issues of process and fairness, apart from the merits of claims, can 
become paramount.6  Thus, for those in the legal academy who consider 
themselves critical, progressive, and feminist—and are considered by others 
to be so—controversial tenure decisions embrace our wider concerns 
relating to equality, free speech, and justice.  
This conversation among the three of us was prompted by our reactions 
during a tenure dispute at the City University of New York School of Law 
(CUNY) where we are tenured professors.  As critical theorists who, despite 
our different backgrounds, racial identities, sexual identities, and career 
paths that led to law teaching, share a lifelong commitment to social justice 
struggles throughout the world, we could not help but be involved in the 
ensuing, and often rancorous, dialogue amongst the law school community.  
We analyzed the rhetoric as it reflected issues of race, gender, class, 
hierarchy, and communication.  Yet we were struck by the fact that we 
found our private conversations revolved around questions of victimization 
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and rhetoric, and were most vociferous in their devotion to class, 
complicity, and, most striking for us, civility.   
Certainly, the nature of the tenure process calls for confidentiality.  Just 
as we were constantly torn between the need to have an open dialogue about 
the issues that loomed so large and the need to respect the process as it 
unfolded during the actual controversy, we have confronted the continuing 
need for confidentiality as we engaged in the process of writing this piece 
and making the choice to publish it.  We have attempted to honor the 
practice of academic confidentiality, intended to protect all the parties 
involved—the person denied tenure as well as the persons who made the 
decision—even as we have decided that an analysis of the situation is vital.  
Our conclusion that publication of such a conversation is necessary is 
prompted by our fruitless search during the time of these events for readings 
that might illuminate our situation.  As scholars, we turned toward 
scholarship to assist us in understanding and theorizing the circumstances in 
which we and our community found ourselves.  Disappointed, we each 
retreated into the specific theorizing with which we were familiar, some of 
which we discuss below.  However, our goal here is to provide an opening 
for other members of the legal academic community, including scholars, 
students, and staff, to discuss these matters in public and in print, rather 
than in a whispered and confidential tête-à-tête.     
Part of what makes our experience notable is the context of CUNY 
School of Law.  Founded in 1983, CUNY School of Law took on a 
challenging institutional mission to diversify the profession both in terms of 
faculty selection and admission policies and to develop a legal pedagogy 
that featured attention to clinical approaches as well as and the ethical 
dimensions of lawyering.7  At the same time, CUNY School of Law had to 
survive and grow within a legal profession that itself was undergoing 
internal and external scrutiny and debates.8  In the past twenty years, the 
demographics of legal academia, as well as the law student population have 
changed, reflecting greater representation of women, people of color, and 
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openly gay and lesbian students and faculty, although faculty diversity 
remains problematic.9  Yet, from its beginning, the CUNY School of Law 
faculty was a diverse one.10  CUNY has also contributed to the diversity of 
legal academia at large, since over the years, a number of our colleagues 
have taken other positions and have often established lawyering or clinical 
programs drawing upon approaches pioneered at CUNY.  In addition to the 
faculty, our student body and other members of the community are likewise 
very diverse.11 
As professors at CUNY, we are reflective of this diversity.  We are 
women, teaching at a law school in which the majority of tenured faculty 
are female.  One of us is Black/African, one is Chinese/American and one is 
Anglo-American.  Two of us are heterosexual while one is a lesbian.  
Interestingly, we are all first generation professionals, and indeed the first in 
our families to attend college.  Thus, while we may be atypical law 
professors and CUNY is certainly a unique law school, we know from 
private and public sources that our experiences are not singular.12  We have 
also realized that our exceptional circumstances provide a grounding for an 
intervention in the broad debates about professional competency, particular 
identities, and the contours of progressive change in the legal academy. 
In the legal academy as elsewhere, much public debate surrounding 
divisive issues can be dominated by voices that silence any possibility of 
engaging publicly as a community in a responsible way.  In any call for 
inclusion and for diversity of voices, we believe it is critical that there is 
respect for voices that raise different and often troubling issues.  During the 
dispute at CUNY, we found ourselves increasingly confronted, and 
somewhat incapacitated, by a range of conceptual and political 
manipulations.  These manipulations challenged our best efforts to honor 
our responsibilities to our students, to the institution, to all our colleagues, 
and to values we believe in such as honesty, professional confidentiality, 
integrity, fairness, and social justice.  At several junctures, we prepared 
public statements, either singly or together, which we decided not to 
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release.  Struggling with the choice to speak or to remain silent, especially 
as we were being threatened with lawsuits,13 was often debilitating.   
We found that much of the public rhetoric circulated reflected uncritical 
assumptions about victimhood, about what was at stake for the institution, 
about the role of race, class, and gender, about the meanings to be attributed 
to silences, about professional and ethical expectations, and about 
professor/student relationships.  In this cauldron of emotions it was difficult 
to engage with the community about all of these questions.  What began as 
a tenure dispute became a symbol for the ubiquitous racism, economic 
exploitation and sexism of American society, and for the continuous 
marginalization of dissenters.  Simple questions became impossible.  The 
inquiry was no longer about the individual candidate’s performance.  More 
disturbingly, it was not about systems and procedures in place to evaluate 
individuals seeking tenure, or the process of developing facts in such a 
process, or even whether the conclusion was particularized or an indication 
of systemic unfairness.  Amidst the internal debates, the Law School also 
received letters and communications from well-meaning outsiders, many of 
whom lacked information, and many of whom made simplistic assumptions 
about our own positions based upon a superficial assessment of identity 
politics. 
The following conversation reflects our attempts to confront these 
disturbing issues.  We decided to engage publicly in this conversation 
because we believe more is at stake than an individual tenure decision and 
its divisive impact on one institution.  At a time when the legal academy 
must do more than simply espouse diversity and social justice commitments 
given the incessant attacks on progressive law and education, it is crucial 
that critical legal scholars and teachers are vigilant against a misuse and 
self-interested appropriation of race, gender, class, and sexuality rhetoric.  
We believe strongly that the purpose of our efforts must be more than the 
creation of mere personal intellectual or professional capital, and we cannot 
contribute to creating an elite, even if diverse, class of colleagues.  We 
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recognize the dangerous potential for misreading and misusing our 
conversation by readers hostile to the values and social justice goals we 
hold dear.  It is a risk we are prepared to take because the harms of not 
speaking as honestly and responsibly as we can at this time, are much 
greater.14  
ASSUMING THE MANTLE OF VICTIMHOOD 
PA: A rhetoric of victimhood has been pronounced during the 
controversies we are considering and my point of departure is a 
consideration of why and how particular individuals adopt the status of 
victim.  I’m hoping this consideration will move beyond the notion of 
political manipulation—that is too crass—and I believe there is a socio-
psychological dimension to this question.  In other words, at what 
subliminal level, beyond the mere manipulation of particular situations, 
does an individual begin to adopt and own the status of victim? 
As a first step I consulted Webster’s dictionary to elicit a definition of 
victim: “…one that is acted upon and unusually adversely affected by a 
force or agent as (1) one that is injured, destroyed, or sacrificed under any 
of various conditions (e.g. of cancer, auto crash); (2) one that is subjected to 
oppression, hardship or mistreatment (frequent, or severe political 
attacks).”15  This definition suggests an element of powerlessness, of loss of 
control.  It is about external factors bearing down upon one’s condition in 
which volition has been abandoned. 
RR: But aren’t these dictionary definitions reductionist?  I have the 
skepticism about victimhood and martyrdom as absolute realities that 
anyone who has read Foucault would have.16  A rudimentary reading of 
Foucault convinces one that the binary opposition between absolute power 
and absolute powerlessness is absolute bunk.  Yet absolutes aside, the 
questions remain regarding differentials in power, which are real and 
concrete.  But I think Foucault should make us wary of the claim of 
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victimhood and martyrdom as a position of lack of power, for the adoption 
of those labels and categories, is, in fact, a power play. 
SKH: The difficulty with definitions—any definitions—is the tendency 
towards not only reductionism, but also their limits in addressing a fluid 
complex reality.  Each of us experiences powerlessness, and each of us 
experiences power in shifting ways depending upon the context, time, and 
other multiple factors.  One challenge presented is how to recognize the 
adoption of labels, say “victims” for example, as a power play which has 
negative manipulative resonance for me, or as an exercise of power that 
accepts responsibility for the choices and the outcomes.  
In addition to Foucault’s work, another example that comes to mind is 
Rey Chow, who makes the intellectual lineage link between the Maoists and 
Charlotte Bronte’s Jane Eyre; for both, the means to moral power “is a 
specific representational position—the position of powerlessness.”17  This 
connection of a high moral ground or legitimacy with powerlessness also 
has implications for the arguments of “outsiders” and inclusion claims 
based upon legitimacy deriving from one’s class, race, gender, sexual 
orientation, or other identity marker.  
PA: Yet implicit in our existential reality is the idea of absence of 
choice; ordinarily people do not choose to be victims.  
RR: And shouldn’t we be choosing not to be victims?  I keep thinking 
of the line from one of Margaret Atwood’s early novels, “above all, refuse 
to be a victim.”18 
PA: Yes, but the vicissitudes of life determine victimhood.  What then 
motivates a person to voluntarily assume such a mantle?  In other words, 
what motivates an internal projection of victimhood as opposed to its 
external catalyst? 
Psychologists probably have a multitude of explanations…. 
RR: Wait—I’m sure they do, but a psychological exploration of 
victimhood is unsettling to me.  When I was diagnosed with a rare and 
usually fatal cancer, I delved into many “alternatives,” including the 
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psychological literature.  What I found was an incessant refrain about 
persons relishing the role of being the victim for the attention it would 
bring.  At the time, I thought this was ludicrous.  Attention in the form of 
painful medical procedures was attention I could do without!  Yet I 
continued to think about this notion and began to see it around me, in very 
disturbing ways.  I have had occasion to wonder whether for some people 
there is a psychological stake in seeing one’s self as a martyr, released from 
responsibility for one’s actions, romanticized and pure, and compellingly 
the center of attention. 
PA: Psychology aside, for me one particular axiom holds: victimhood 
confers on the victim a certain moral leverage.  This is most apparent in a 
discussion, for example, of attempts to overturn past discrimination of 
certain groups who have been historically discriminated against.  The 
individual member of that group represents the antithesis of the moral 
wrongdoer, the discriminator.  She is cloaked in a certain morality implicit 
in the victimhood.  
This is appropriate.  For example, any reference to the history of slavery 
cannot avoid the immorality of enslaving an individual.19  We can explore 
this theme indefinitely because American history, indeed human history, is 
littered with immoral acts that perpetrators inflict upon victims.  But I want 
to distinguish this situation; that is, the infliction of harm that results in 
victimhood, from the situation in which an individual chooses to adopt the 
status. 
NARRATIVE STRATEGIES 
PA: But how does one who chooses to adopt victim status 
successfully portray it?  How does the victim’s narrative unfold?  The 
victim constructs a worldview that posits herself as the “other,” in a 
minority as it were, and in an essentially antagonistic relationship with the 
majority.  The narrative is a fairly simplistic one of good and bad, 
harnessing theoretical devices to complete the narrative.  She is constantly 
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in a dialectical tension with the majority.  In this postulation, the victim’s 
lack of control over process and substance is preeminent.  No 
accommodation is made for her ability to shape her destiny.  She denies her 
control. 
SKH: But I think the effectiveness of such a narrative lies not only in its 
simple appeal as a battle between good and evil.  A narrative plays well 
depending upon the ways it resonates with the listener’s own narrative 
about her life or the way the world should be.  The CUNY community is 
made up of individuals who have in one way or another struggled against 
discrimination or oppression, and many of us are from working class, or 
minority backgrounds.  For this community, a narrative about racism or 
sexism touches many of us where we live.  The troubling aspect of the 
success of a simplistic race or gender narrative and rhetoric is that the 
faculty are mostly lawyers, and the students are lawyers in training.  How 
can we produce effective public interest lawyers if we allow ourselves or 
our students to uncritically accept asserted facts, assume motivations, or 
ignore the complexity of realities and difficulty of choices and decisions?  
RR: Yes, and I have been struck by the way in which narrative in this 
instance had the power to override certain facts.  Several years ago, I 
engaged with the critiques of “outsider narratives” from the lesbian 
narrative perspective,20 and part of what I was theorizing was that 
narrativity was becoming a troubled practice.  Using the work of Sue-Ellen 
Case, it seemed to me quite possible that postmodernism meant the end of 
coherent narrative, given the rise of what she names “screen/visual 
culture”—as opposed to print culture—and its characteristic allowance of 
multiple arrangements of data into non-sequential and non-linear non-
narratives.21  If narrativity means beginning-middle-end as classically 
defined by Aristotle, then we seemed to be departing from this structure 
with digital programs, hypertexts, and seemingly never-ending computer 
“games.” 
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So the power of the narrative in this instance to affect certain people, 
even when those people would express contradictory information based 
upon their own perceptions and experiences, and even when their 
conclusion was contrary to their own expressed self-interest, was a 
testament to modernism.  Or perhaps a testament to pre-modernism, in its 
mythic and pre-rationalist sense.  
INTELLECTUAL OPPRESSION 
SKH: Yes, but we are forgetting that the victimhood of which we are is 
in the context of a tenure decision, that is, an academic and intellectual 
context.  Consider Chow’s critique of power dynamics and self-
positioning(s) of Third World intellectuals, especially those working in 
Asian studies:   
We need to remember as intellectuals that the battles we fight 
are battles of words...What academic intellectuals must confront is 
thus not their ‘victimization’ by society at large (or their 
victimization-in-solidarity-with-the-oppressed), but the power, 
wealth, and privilege that ironically accumulate from their 
‘oppositional’ viewpoint, and the widening gap between the 
professed contents of their words and the upward mobility they 
gain from such words.22   
That is, although identifying with the “powerless,” one is actually speaking 
with power and is exercising power.  
PA: And we exercise power in a variety of contexts as law 
professors—evaluating our students, mentoring and guiding them in their 
chosen career paths, developing our expertise, and often deriving enormous 
material and non-material benefits as a consequence.  Peer evaluation, 
inside or outside our own institutions, also involves an exercise of power. 
SKH: Chow cites examples of intellectuals who reference various self-
markers of victimization or ties to victims as a way to highlight one’s “own 
sense of alterity and political righteousness.”23  Her examples remind me of 
one of our colleague’s complaints that CUNY oppresses him in its 
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becoming “bureaucratic” and more and more structured.  Yet holding 
classes on time or having to be on campus more than two days a week does 
not seem to me like oppression.  
RR: Sharon, we can’t be saying that we really don’t believe that 
intellectuals can be victims?  I don’t believe we are saying that, or we 
would be denying the realities of the U.S. “Red Scares,” the Chinese 
Cultural revolution, Pol Pot’s regime in Cambodia, and the apartheid 
government in South Africa’s use of the security apparatus to stifle dissent 
on campus.  And yet, I do think that it is a terrible injustice when our 
rhetoric makes impoverishment, imprisonment, and death commensurate 
with something like a denial of tenure. 
SKH: There is incommensurability of different injustices.  Of course, I 
agree that intellectuals have certainly been subjected to terrible repression 
and abuses, especially in the examples you gave.  Perhaps we need a sense 
of proportionality demanded by humility, responsibility, and reality.   
Situated inside of an academic institution in the U.S., for example, how 
can one draw comparisons between the Holocaust, a hunger strike, and an 
individual tenure decision, asserting in fact the “right” to a lifetime job 
framed as a fight for the “soul” of an institution?  While we can recognize 
the sincerity of choices made, we also need to open up the frame and ask, 
can one do this without profoundly dishonoring those millions who died in 
the Nazi camps, or who are starving inside Chinese prisons or labor camps 
today, or the hundreds of millions around the world who are suffering daily 
from severe poverty, disease, and wars? 
PA: Sharon, I absolutely agree.  But sometimes I fear that perspective 
is jettisoned in the attempt to relate this particular injustice or instance of 
oppression to the ones you just mentioned.  In addition, involving idealistic 
students whose hunger to instantly change the world provides a recipe for 
significant distortions. 
SKH: However, I think there are theoretical and political complexities 
presented by and to an institution such as CUNY—that is, our mission is to 
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produce lawyers who will serve underrepresented communities.  In many 
cases, our students are individuals from these communities.  As public 
interest lawyers, our goals are to protect and empower individuals and 
communities who have been victimized, excluded, or exploited.   
PA: What then is our responsibility as people who care about victims?  
In its most rudimentary form, our lifelong commitments have been about 
caring for victims.24  How do we allow the space for victims to unravel their 
narratives, while at the same time allowing ourselves a certain vigilance to 
protect victimhood from being obfuscated by opportunism? 
SKH: I think of working with our clients in the Immigrant and Refugee 
Rights Clinic, and the challenge for our students to gain the trust of asylum 
clients who have suffered horrific abuses, and how hard it is for students to 
learn how to pull the story out and yet allow space for the story to emerge.  
An important lesson from that process is how important is it for the client to 
be empowered by the process and not simply winning an asylum 
application.  Another important lesson is the need to critically examine the 
whole factual basis for a story because in the end, it’s not in a client’s 
interest to ignore “inconvenient” facts or parts of the story.  Furthermore, 
although the narrative of a client’s past victimization may be used 
opportunistically to support a legal claim, the goal is not to engender a life-
long embrace of victimhood.  I suspect what you were referring to, Penny, 
is another opportunistic use of a self-victimization narrative, that is, its use 
by an intellectual or an academic, or someone who is privileged and 
powerful. 
AUTHENTICITY AND CLASS 
RR: The problem of narrative that Chow addresses is troubling.  I’m 
specifically troubled by the way in which narratives are “authenticated” by 
background and experience.  For example, it was very difficult to resist the 
impulse to trot out my own impoverished background to give credence to 
my position.  I resisted because I believe that such a rhetorical move has 
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inauthenticity at its heart.  I struggled very hard to escape that background 
and I don’t think that its use to legitimate my present positions is warranted.  
Nevertheless, it is difficult not to have an emotional reaction, somewhat 
akin to being assaulted, when I am presumed to have come from a more 
privileged position than someone I view as incredibly privileged, someone 
whose childhood I can only imagine and envy.    
And I can’t help but notice that the three of us, despite incredible 
dissimilarities in geography, race, and context, nevertheless share this 
experience.  
PA: Yes, I grew up in apartheid South Africa, classified as a Coloured 
in a poor working-class community.  I have endeavored my whole life to 
escape the box I was born into.  I do not mean that I am trying to shed my 
identity.  To the contrary, I am very proud of it.  What I have attempted to 
discard are limited expectations, a parochial vision, and the mirror of 
“whiteness.”  What cachet could I possibly expect from constant reference 
to a past that I have spent my life overcoming.  For authenticity?    
Is that not chicanery?    
SKH: I know what you mean about people making assumptions about 
our backgrounds.  I find this dynamic that Ruthann experiences as an 
assault, and I experience it as erasure; it is present in different ways 
depending upon the setting.  When I went back to visit my father’s village 
in China, all the Homs—it was a patrilocal village—assumed that I was 
enormously wealthy and could give enough money to build the new village 
school.  The fact that I am teaching at a poor, state-funded public law 
school; that I am a single parent having to support a child bound for college 
(and other family members); that I live in an expensive urban area; and the 
fact that for most of my childhood, we lived in the back of a small Chinese 
hand laundry, were realities all too foreign to even imagine.  Yet, when I am 
in the U.S. at law or academic meetings or conferences, I often feel the 
weight of a poor immigrant and working class background around my neck, 
a sign of my economic outsiderness easily read—I imagine—by others. 
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PA: I have similar experiences going back to South Africa—this 
hybrid existence as it were.  But this is surely the dilemma of the migrant, a 
constant linking to a past—both physically and emotionally—and the 
realities of the present.  The past, present, and future create a certain 
alchemy of identity and geography which in some ways typifies the 
migrant’s existence.    
RR: Class—by which I mean poverty—however, is what is elided, 
except for when it appears as a romanticized version of the past, or when, as 
I said, it is trotted out for the sake of authenticity.  We of lower class origins 
who have “succeeded” by becoming professionals—not merely professors, 
but law professors—are testaments to the American myth of upward 
mobility.  Illogically co-existing with this is the rhetoric that we are all 
equal.25  Yet it often seems to me that there is a certain “class 
consciousness,” as essentialist as this sounds, that is not erased.  It is this 
consciousness that determines certain judgments about “privilege” that I 
continue to make.  
SKH: Within CUNY, we are approached for all kinds of financial 
support for various causes and activities, and the assumption is that we can 
all afford to support everything and anything without reference to the 
internal economic hierarchies or, in fact, what our lives and other 
responsibilities are.  Yet the bottom-line is that I also try to remind myself 
how privileged I am.  My parents worked seven days a week at hard jobs in 
restaurants or our laundry for most of their lives.  Most of the people 
outside of academia, and the support staff within academia, work five or 
more days a week.  Law professors have a high degree of autonomy in their 
choices about work and some choose to work considerably less or devote 
their energies to matters of their own choosing.  Even if I can’t afford to 
underwrite the building of a new school in China, my life and economic 
status is a lot easier and more privileged than most.  Still, I find it very 
troubling each time I am confronted by the unexamined assumptions of 
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entitlement and unearned privilege that individuals from privileged lives 
often exhibit. 
ON DIGNITY 
PA: I want to add another concept to the discourse around 
victimhood, a concept that is sometimes lost in the cacophony of emotions 
as some individuals try to establish credibility, authenticity, or license to 
center their experiences.  The concept I’m thinking of is dignity.  I 
immediately thought about this in response to Ruthann’s concern about not 
wanting to excavate her own history for the purposes of authenticity.  I 
sense what motivates you, Ruthann, is dignity.  That is certainly what 
propels me not to expose myself and my past.   
Although dignity is a paramount reason, another one is the recognition 
that my experience is not unique.  In other words, there are so many people 
who have excelled against the greatest odds, and for whom struggle is a 
mode of being.  They often individually and collectively refuse to succumb 
to grandiose reflections about the trajectory of their lives, and where they 
now find themselves.  I am here not trying to aggrandize my personal 
history, but merely to acknowledge this particular issue.  
Another reason is a profound belief—which is often sorely tested—that 
honesty and the truth will prevail.  Franz Fanon, Nelson Mandela, and Steve 
Biko have all written about one of the key components of colonialism, the 
stripping of the dignity of individuals and communities through a variety of 
subtle and not so subtle mechanisms.26  The location of the “other”—now 
referred to as the subaltern27—is about the fundamental denial of dignity.  I 
use these writers to reference the experience of racially colonized people 
and I am centering racism as a dignity stripping process.  But analogies 
exist with sexism and homophobia.  I choose therefore not to compromise 
my dignity in order to establish credibility or authenticity.  I recognize that 
it is a risky proposition.   
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Philip Roth explores this theme in his novel, The Human Stain.28   There 
the protagonist’s insistence, quite validly, on his “being right” after spurious 
allegations of racism, costs him dearly.  But I think dignity should not be a 
casualty of political opportunism.  
RR: Penny, we shared that Philip Roth novel and I have to admit that I 
wondered if I would have been so impressed with it had I read it at a 
different time.  Roth is far from one of my favorite writers, but the novel 
resonated with so much of what I was experiencing.  But, I wonder if you 
could say a bit more about “dignity” as a positive concept, especially in the 
work you referenced.  The obvious analogue in sexuality politics is “pride,” 
but it has always seemed to me to be an undertheorized concept in queer 
theory.  I also have some suspicions about it—does it mask “endurance” of 
one’s lot rather than an action for change? 
PA: I understand and agree with you that the concept of “dignity” 
connotes notions of stoicism, a sentiment that does not necessarily generate 
attempts to change the status quo.  I think, however, that one can be stoic 
but still willing to engage in transformative actions.  I was thinking of 
dignity in another sense though.  And it is one that I have picked up 
increasingly with reference to human rights.  The Constitutional Court used 
this concept to articulate its reasons for outlawing the death penalty in 
South Africa.  It referred to this idea as an African concept, Ubuntu, which 
translates into human-ness or humanity.  It is a traditional African concept 
that explains a deep-rooted empathy, one-ness, and love of one’s kin and 
community.  The idea is probably akin to what Westerners refer to as 
fundamental or inalienable—the idea of fundamental or inalienable human 
rights.  Increasingly, the discourse on human rights in Africa is focusing on 
the notion of dignity.  For example, before the Constitutional Court in South 
Africa handed down its Grootboom decision29—delineating a right to 
adequate housing—the President of the Court gave a very moving lecture in 
which he referred to the persistent denial of the dignity of South Africans by 
the inequitable economic relations still prevalent there.30  I therefore 
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understand the concept of dignity to carry with it a deep-seated notion of 
fairness, which may be born from a sense of individual or shared struggle, 
and which sets the parameters for engagement with others.  
SKH: In Cantonese, we have a similar phrase, “to be a person.” The 
worst thing one can say about another, is that she does not know how to be 
a person, suggesting someone who is so out of touch with what a human 
being should be about, someone who lacks compassion and dignity.  But of 
course in some ways, this being human is culturally situated in ideas such as 
family, the community, loyalty, and friendship.  At Human Rights in China 
(HRIC)31 we often use the word dignity in the context of our goals to 
protect the dignity of political prisoners, the majority of Chinese people, 
migrants, poor, rural populations, and ethnic minorities who are denied 
basic rights and means for economic and spiritual survival.  
I especially like Penny’s use of the phrase “dignity as a casualty of 
political opportunism.”  I think honesty, critical debate, and possibilities for 
change are also casualties when group interactions or discourses are stifled 
by individual or group political opportunism.  The question also arises as to  
when it is a tactic or move “opportunism” versus just being plain effective?  
Opportunism has a negative valence that we might make more explicit.  
Dignity, pride, and endurance are part of the racial story about Chinese 
specifically, and Asians more generally, as immigrants. They have the 
capacity for hard work, suffering, and endurance—all of which are 
interrelated.  Whether dignity “masks” suffering or rage, or whether dignity 
is one response to drawing lines of personal integrity and space, here is 
where I refuse to reveal anymore in this cacophony of voices; this is in part 
a question of cultural and shifting cultural values and frames. 
PA: Although I mention the centering of dignity in South Africa’s 
constitutional jurisprudence, the concept is so multi-layered and so 
complex—as you point out Sharon—that I wonder at the wisdom of 
attempting to unravel or deconstruct its meaning. 
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SKH: Chow offers a provocative reading of Zhang Yimou’s film To 
Live.  To Live is a film where everything is endured—famines, deaths of 
your children, political chaos, social destruction, a cultural revolution where 
everyone was complicit in someone’s betrayal, and silencing where 
speaking had to be within the approved rhetoric.  Chow describes the 
ending of the film where one of the characters fades off into the darkness—
possibly to live or to commit suicide—to refuse to live and to refuse to 
endure like Chinese people have always done.  This refusal to endure is 
ultimately a radical act, the only dignified claim one can have in the face of 
oppressive nationalistic state claims and demands that you endure.  
Pride seems related to, and different from, dignity.  Although like dignity, 
it can be a source of living with a sense of integrity and self-worth, and like 
dignity, it has another face—one that is not so positive. But pride, ethnic 
pride for example, can easily move into—or be manipulated into—a 
dangerous nationalism.  One thinks of Germany in World War II, or 
China’s ability to manipulate massive Chinese sentiment against the U.S. 
and the west.  Both are examples of how ethnic pride can be manipulated by 
political opportunists in power to shift attention away from domestic unrest.  
Why do I call this opportunism?  Because it is done for the sole purpose of 
maintaining one’s position of power.  
PA: That is one of the reasons I often balk at assertions of identity.  In 
this “free market,” “race neutral,” privatized world, we have been left with 
few effective tools to combat the many forms of subjugation and 
discrimination that significant proportions of individuals and groups still 
encounter in this country.  And so assertion of identity as a response is 
apposite.  But I am often left with a lingering discomfort about its long-term 
efficacy.32  
SKH: In my current work at HRIC,33 the word “victim” is used a lot.  
For example, the term was used in the context of the Tiananmen Mothers 
Campaign where the mothers of missing children killed in 1989 demanded 
an accounting from the Beijing government.  In addition, the prisoners of 
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conscience who suffer beatings, torture, and other physical and mental 
abuses were termed “victims.”  Further, there are millions of desperately 
poor, rural and migrant Chinese “victims” of clear government policies that 
discriminate in terms of housing, education, and employment and condemn 
them to a lifetime of poverty.  However, these “victims” have organized, 
spoken out and demanded answers.  I am struck by the very different ways 
each dissident comes to terms with and lives with his or her past.  Some 
have used their past persecution or imprisonment to obtain opportunities for 
personal advancement and access—say comfortably settling in some elite 
academic institution.  But who is to say whether this is “opportunism,” an 
effective use of one’s own past victimhood, or a cosmic accounting?  Yet 
there are those who work quietly and concretely, helping others still inside, 
who talk about their years inside the prisons without drama, without a sense 
of self-pity or victimization—it is humbling.  Like Fanon, Mandela, and 
many others, they suffered and endured, they spoke out, and they also kept 
their silences and their dignity.  
ARTICULATE SILENCES? 
RR: This notion of speaking out and keeping silent was, I think, at the 
heart of our experiences during the controversies at CUNY.  As lawyers, 
academics, and as feminists, we privilege language.  As lawyers, we focus 
on language and testimony in ways in which have always troubled me—I 
think of the evidence rule that silence is acquiescence as exemplifying this.  
As academics we write and publish, and as a teacher I have said on 
countless occasions to students when reviewing their exams, “If you don’t 
say it or write it, I don’t know that you know it.”  And as feminists, we have 
been politicized by a discourse in which “breaking silence” is valorized, as 
the number of texts using this concept exemplifies.34 
Yet silence is also so important.  As Adrienne Rich noted in a recent 
essay, silence can be “fertilizing.”  Silence can be a condition of vision and 
imaginative space; and these silences are endangered by commerce, 
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appropriation, and I would add, by insincere rhetoric that forces one to 
dispute it.35  I feel as if we are forced to incessantly chose  between 
speaking or staying silent, and to constantly assess the risks of speaking and 
not speaking. 
PA: And we mostly chose the latter.   This raises an issue that I 
suspect has both cultural and gendered connotations.   My own culture, that 
is, the one into which I was born (African/Christian/Third World) has 
prioritized selflessness as a cardinal virtue.  Modesty and humility are 
therefore values to be aspired to; one need not be the loudest voice, and 
silence is almost always the preferred option.  This virtue takes on 
particularly pronounced measurements in a patriarchal society.   So for me, 
reverting back to that cultural space of (dignified) silence was comforting.   
And to my way of thinking, it was superior to the public servings of moral 
righteousness that constantly bombarded us.  That feminized (feminine and 
feminist) part of me exists in a constant tension between feelings of 
absolute certainty—about my convictions—and that part of me that strives 
to accommodate, to conciliate, and to mediate.    
SKH: When I wrote about “articulate silences,” 36 I was invoking the 
work of King-Kok Cheung, who argued that the logocentric privileging of 
“voice” obscures the many tongues, and that silence, too, can speak, thus 
colonizing the very differences we seek to recognize.  I suggest that silence 
can also be full, rich, and the product of clear intention, not only 
powerlessness or fear.  Yet, one student reading my book countered that, 
“asking a society that barely listens to the voices that are speaking to take 
the time to listen to the silences is asking a lot and possibly too much.  It 
does not offer too much hope.”37  After the painful experience of last year, I 
think it may be asking too much now to ask people who are shouting—often 
with an absolute certitude and passion of the young, the very dogmatic, or 
self-righteous—and it may be certainly too much to ask of someone who 
thinks his or her own professional survival is at stake.  But I wonder if we 
620 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
THEORY INTO PRACTICE 
will lose our very civility if we do not at least ask each other not only to 
speak, but also to listen. 
PA: So where does all of this take us?   What political lessons do we 
draw from this experience in which morality, and maybe even our own kind 
of political savvy, were neutralized by what I can only call pious self-
interest?  Our values and our perceptions were turned upside down for 
political expediency, and our political and legal acumen—and indeed our 
integrity—were constantly challenged.  How does that affect our continuous 
conversation about the different axes of identity(ies) that we constantly 
grapple with?   For me, this episode served to reinforce an uneasy sense that 
class continues to be separated from discussions of political identity, 
thereby precluding an exhaustive analysis of the issues raised.   
And how will all of this be reflected in time?  This episode reminded me 
somewhat of the article that Randall Kennedy wrote years back in which he 
criticized some Critical Race theorists for their parochial and essentialist 
approaches to law, and specifically for the proposed effect racial differences 
have on scholarly influence and prestige in legal academia.38  There is no 
space here to go into the merits of his critique and the ensuing debate, but 
he was roundly vilified by critical race theorists and seen as a “race traitor.”  
And yet, those same reflections have now been raised in various contexts, 
without the rancor that greeted his piece.39  They have arguably served to 
enrich the scholarly landscape for critical legal scholars. 
And how do we approach community again, now that we have witnessed 
the fissures that erupt when racial/gendered/ideological/class injustice is 
served as a given?  When silencing becomes such a powerful political 
tactic?  One possible way is to commence a dialogue once the emotional 
detritus has settled.  To be productive, this dialogue should  incorporate 
lessons from the experience, but also an evaluation of how we articulate the 
concerns of race, gender, class, and ideology as a struggle that is both 
personal and that shapes our community.  This raises a further question: 
A Conversation on Complicity and Civility in Legal Academia 621 
VOLUME 1 • ISSUE 3 • 2003 
how does a small, sheltered community alter and broaden its reference 
points to embrace a more nuanced version of events? 
RR: Sheltered?  I’m not sure I agree with that.  I think that part of 
what has happened in our community is that we haven’t been sufficiently 
“sheltered,” and we have brought with us the baggage of our public and 
private lives, including our work in other institutions.  I think that part of 
the problem has been that we have been unwilling to grant a sort of “good 
faith” to others.  Not a generalized good faith, but a more specific kind 
based upon a shared commitment to social justice.  Certainly, we have 
differences about the particular parameters of that social justice vision and 
differences regarding tactics, but if any small group of us found ourselves 
together in a less progressive institution, we would bond together 
irrevocably.  Perhaps this is what you meant by sheltered? 
PA: Ruthann, you make an important point, but I’m not sure if I agree 
entirely.  I think we have been sheltered by our histories, and we have 
developed ideological habits that end up being “conversation stoppers” or 
short cuts to conversations we should be engaged in at length.  I’m 
specifically thinking of us having conversations that are shorn of the 
linguistic filtering that we customarily engage in, in order to strike just the 
right balance.   By “sheltered” I mean the sense that we all believe in the 
same thing.  I think we share some fundamental beliefs—a broad vision of 
social justice. 
But that is far too broad, and I’m not even sure if that is accurate.  In any 
event, as we’ve seen fundamental, ideological, and other shifts in this 
society, and substantial economic and political changes, we have not always 
considered the impact they have on our community.  That impact is most 
pronounced when we discuss issues related to our intellectual endeavors 
and work products: curriculum, our expectations of each other or our 
students, merit, workloads, and related matters.  And in the way we will not 
question—publicly, at least—the class and other differences that are so 
obvious, or the privileging of certain sentiments over others.  By “sheltered” 
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I also mean the way we assume the worst—about ourselves and the 
institution—when, in actuality, if we engaged in some comparisons we may 
come to different conclusions.  Maybe I am agreeing with you after all. 
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
SKH: We now have a lot on the table—victimhood, authenticity, 
legitimacy, dignity, race, sexuality, class, culture, ethnicity, histories—and 
the impulse for having a more nuanced conversation about issues of 
victimhood and victimization.  We are not just engaging in another pro 
forma invocation of difference and identity regarding our original concerns 
about victimhood. 
PA: Essentially how do we situate ourselves, our experiences, and 
perspectives, within the broader context of a global struggle, versus the 
immediate, personal, and professional “struggles” we are reluctant 
participants in?  When are we victims, and how do we honorably 
appropriate victimhood? 
RR: Yet I remain uncomfortable with appropriating victimhood.  I 
would like to be able to speak from a place of empowerment with the goal 
of empowering others.  Maybe it’s too much feminist studies.  Call it pride, 
dignity, refusing to be a victim, or something else.  But I abhor pity and do 
not think it is politically useful.  It leads to discourses such as the 
“deserving poor.”  As if only those who we can label as victims “deserve” 
assistance or a life that is not a struggle to survive on a material level. 
SKH: I am motivated to say something publicly because of how often 
this concept and rhetoric are used and misused in public discourse.  So 
perhaps it’s useful to reframe and ask questions that focus on the complex 
range of factors that a principled grappling with the claims of victims call 
for.  Ruthann started with an example of victims as bringing to mind 
something one could not control—like an accident.  But as we’ve talked, 
the range of contexts for thinking about “victims” range from group claims 
(e.g., reparations for racism or slavery here in the U.S. or in South Africa), 
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national claims (e.g., claims of former colonized states), individual claims 
(e.g.,a denial of tenure or academic appointment) and so forth.  The 
“injuries” claimed have ranged from emotional to intellectual to economic 
to historical—for example, the loss or erasure of various histories—and so 
forth.  The rhetoric that has been used reflects various strategic purposes or 
goals—such as inducing guilt, raising awareness, empowering one’s self 
under the guise of claiming a powerless position, empowering oneself by 
naming, and rejecting the victim status.  So I think about a matrix of 
factors—context, claims, injuries, strategic uses—for critical (self) 
assessment and to be vigilant of and against being targets of the political 
opportunism that silences, manipulates, and ultimately undermines the 
possibility of progressive action or coalitions. 
PA: When we initiated this conversation, I had considered silence as 
the most honorable option—and also the most viable.  But I’ve 
subsequently altered my perceptions of silence as a legitimate response.  I 
think our endeavors as members of an academic community will be 
disrupted if silence is elevated to the most moral option.  I believe we need 
to be strategic about invoking silences—maybe it should be a last resort.  In 
these difficult times in the academy and elsewhere, I fear that the alternative 
becomes counterproductive. 
 
It is now two years since the events which form the basis of this 
conversation occurred.  The community has returned to its usual 
preoccupations and much of the events surrounding the tenure dispute have 
been forgotten.  We have learned some valuable lessons from the 
experience, mostly to do with confronting difficult political issues enmeshed 
with self-interested opportunism.  We want to recapture the hackneyed 
feminist adage, “the personal is political.”  In these times of shrinking 
resources—particularly within the educational sector—ideological 
polaralization, political opportunism, racism, sexism, economic 
exploitation, and homophobia will continue, but we are more convinced 
624 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
THEORY INTO PRACTICE 
than ever that we have to be vigilant about our integrity and the integrity of 
the institutions that we build. 
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